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INTRODUCTION: DOES THE CONSTITUTION GOVERN? 
William F. Connelly, Jr. and William Lasser 
Guest Editors 
A hundred or even 50 years ago, the question "Does the Constitution 
Govern?" would have been regarded as a banality hardly worthy of consider-
ation. To traditional political thinkers, the influence of the Constitution on 
American politics was a given; the Constitution, as the legal scholar Thomas 
Cooley wrote, was nothing less than "that body of rules and maxims in ac-
cordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised." 1 To 
the question "Does the Constitution Govern?" traditional political scientists 
would have answered yes, and yawned, and wonder why the question was 
even asked. 
The behavioralist revolution transformed the political scientist's view of 
the Constitution, just as it transformed political science itself. Behavioralism 
as applied to political science sought "to explain the phenomena of government 
in terms of the observed and observable behavior of people." 2 Such an ap-
proach tended to downplay the importance of institutions and ideas, and to 
reject abstraction and formalism. One casualty of the behavioralist revolution 
was the Constitution of the United States, at least as a major factor in political 
scientists' attempts to understand American government and politics. A few 
political scientists continued to study constitutional law, but even the public 
law subfield was replaced by an emphasis on judicial politics or judicial behavior. 
For much of the post-World War II era, American political science has neglected 
the Constitution, and many post-war thinkers would have dismissed our inquiry 
as a nostalgic but ultimately uninteresting enterprise. Their answer to the 
question "Does the Constitution Govern" would have been a simple and flat 
"No." 
In recent years, however, the role of institutions in general and of the 
Constitution in particular has begun once again to attract the attention of 
students of American government. An increasing number of political scientists 
have found the behavioralist model too restrictive, and of incomplete explan-
atory value in assessing the larger questions of American politics. In their 
attempt to fill in the gaps, these modem thinkers have begun to take the 
Constitution seriously, so to speak, but not too seriously. They seek a com-
prehensive and integrated approach to the study of politics, seeing the Con-
stitution (and institutions in general) as one factor governing our political 
system, but not as the only factor. The Constitution governs, in their view, 
but it does not govern alone or completely. 
At the bicentennial of the United States Constitution, unlike at its cen-
tennial or sesquicentennial, the question "Does the Constitution Govern?" is 
both timely and relevant to the concerns of a growing number of American 
political scientists. This special issue of the Journal of Political Science presents 
a number of diverse answers to that question, from a variety of perspectives 
and across a range of American political science subfields. 
1 
I 
The rejuvenated interest in institutions in general and in the Constitu-
tion in particular is reflected in all areas of American political science, as the 
essays in the following pages clearly demonstrate. Certainly one would ex-
pect such interest to be generated in fields like public law, and it is; one 
can, however, see the impact of this transformation in areas that tradition-
ally neglected the Constitution altogether, such as in the study of inte rest 
group politics. 
The study of public law, of course, has always been heavily committed 
to taking the Constitution seriously. Edward S. Corwin, perhaps the great-
est of all public law scholars in this century, devoted an entire book to The 
Constitution and What It Means Today; and even in his other books empha-
sizes constitutional interpretation and formal constitutional principles. The 
field of public law at first focused almost exclusively on the constitutional de-
cisions of the courts, and especially the Supreme Court; and on the philo-
sophical and theoretical foundations of those decisions and of the American 
constitutional system in general. The titles of even of few of Corwin's es-
says present the flavor of this early approach to public law: among many 
others, he wrote "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional 
Law"; "Some Lessons from the Constitution of 1787"; "The Constitution as 
Instrument and Symbol"; and "The Impact of the Idea of Evolution on the 
American Political and Constitutional Tradition." Whatever else they did, 
Corwin and his contemporaries certainly took the Constitution seriously. 
The behavioralist revolution, however, did not leave the field of public 
law untouched. For a while, in fact, especially in the 1960's, the Constitu-
tion threatened to disappear from the field of public law almost entirely. 
New approaches seemed more promising and less naive; judicial biography 
flourished, as did new initiatives like the analysis of "judicial strategy " and 
the quantitative assessment of judicial behavior. Courts and judges were 
now conceptualized as political actors creating policy outputs just like their 
counterparts in Congress and the presidency; and if congressional or presi-
dential scholars did not find the Constitution of analytical value, why should 
public law scholars? 
The behavioralist revolution in the field of public law, however, was an 
imcomplete one. In the 1980's, the old approach coexists with the new, and 
the field, as Lawence Baum put it, "has taken with a vengeance C. Herman 
Pritchett's advice to "Let a hundred flowers bloom." 3 Public law scholars 
have rediscovered constitutional theory, constitutional interpretatio n, consti-
tutional history, and constitutional law. This newly rediscovere d emphasis 
on the Constitution does not assume that the formal study of the Constitu-
tion is enough, by itself, to understand the courts; far from it. But it does 
regard the Constitution as one of the central elements, and perhaps the cen-
tral element, in understanding the role of courts and judges . 
Nowhere is the new approach to public law more clearly reflecte d than 
in the spate of books being published in connection with the Constitution bi-
2 
• 1 Consider only the three discussed by Sue Davis in her review 
cente~\his volume; they approach the study of the Constitution from the 
e~say Ill fields of legal philosophy, history, and traditional constitutional inter-
diverst~ When books like these can coexist with studies that utilize quanti-preta 10n. 
. analysis formal modeling, and a host of other approaches, the field of 
tat1ve ' 
ublic Jaw is surely a healthy and robust one. _ 
p 1 the area of interest groups, to take the second example, the influ-:f the new approach has been, if anything, even more dramatic. Dur-
ence f . . d d I f 
. the 1950s and 1960s the study o mterest groups game a great ea o 
~~f ention precisely because this relatively. ne:v s_ubfi~ld seemed to _liberate 
the political scientist from the confines of mstitutionalism and formalism. As 
Graham K. Wilson recently wrote, 
Twenty-five years ago, the study of interest groups 
seemed likely to be one of the main branches of political 
science. The growing awareness of interest groups which 
scholars showed could be viewed as one of the most prom-
ising developments in the discipline. The study of interest 
groups would free political science from the straight jacket 
of the study of political institutions and constitutions; in-
terest groups were part of the substance of real politics, 
not the arid principles of constitutional law. Above all, the 
study of interest groups would bridge the gap between the 
study of politics and the study of society . 4 
Robert Dahl, with his Preface to Democratic Theory and Who Governs? 
was at the center of this attempt to move the study and practice of politics 
beyond the constraints of the institutional and formalist approach that had 
characterized the study of American politics ever since James Madison. Dahl 
criticized Madison for fostering an excessive concern with constitutional prin-
ciples such as the separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and 
bicameralism. "The Madisonian argument exaggerates the importance, in pre-
venting tyranny, of specified governmental officials; it underestimates the im-
portance of the inherent social checks and balances existing in every pluralist 
society." Dahl took this critique even a step further : "If constitutional factors 
are not entirely irrelevent," he concluded, "their significance is trivial as com-
pared with the non-constitutional." Constitutional rules, Dahl wrote, "are not 
crucial, independent factors in maintaining democracy; rather, the rules them-
selves seem to be functions of underlying non-constitutional factors." Madison's 
concern with "the proper structure of the Union," according to Dahl, was 
excessive because constitutional structure is epiphenomena!. Constitutional 
limitations, he insisted, are merely a "Chesire cat." 5 
Thirty years later the field of interest group politics appears to be coming 
around full circle, as seen for example in a study by Nelson Polsby, one of 
Dahl's foremost students. In Political Innovation in America, Polsby returns 
modem pluralist theory to the serious consideration of the influence of con-
stitutional principles and structure on the behavior of individuals and groups. 
In response to those who argue that the American political system manifests 
3 
a bias against policy initiation, Polsby argues that the policy process is suffi-
~iently ?ecentralize~ an~ pe~~able so ~s to allow, and e~en encourage, policy 
innovation. Innovation m politics requires that the political system provid 
sufficient incentives to policy makers to search for innovations. These incen~ 
tives, Polsby suggests, are "incorporated into the constitutional routines of 
the American political process as they affect the ambitions of politicians _ 
routines associated with the electoral cycle and routines associated with the 
separation of powers." 6 The Constitution, in Polsby's view, establishes a 
multicentered, rather than hierarchical, decision-making structure, thus en-
suring the . institutionalized competition and conflict of a pluralism bounded by 
a decentralized political structure . In Polsby's view, quite clearly, one cannot 
simply separate social structure and political structure. 
Critics of the pluralist literature over the past few decades also seemed 
to depreciate the importance of constitutional structure. In pointing to the 
biases of pluralism in theory and practice, elite theorists, for example, often 
argue that broad interests, such as consumer or environmental interests, are 
not adequately represented by organized interest groups. Indeed, the most 
general interest, namely the public interest, is, in their view, the most chron-
ically underrepresented of all. 
Madison, were he alive to defend himself, might insist that constitutional 
government is itself the organization and articulation of the public interest, as 
seen for example, in the principle of representation. An argument can be made 
that the constitutional principle of representation, as embodied in the delib-
erations within Congress and between the President and Congress, provides 
the most immediate and tangible expression of the common good. And yet, 
pluralist and anti-pluralist theorists alike have labeled such an argument naive, 
and have called into question the very nature of representatio n. Implacable 
foes on most everything else, on this pluralists and their critics often agree: 
an elected representative is more readily the agent or advocate of his particular 
group or class interest, and infrequently, not to say never, is he sincerely the 
trustee of the public interest. Much of the literature on Congress reflects this 
somewhat cynical view. But today we are seeing a reconsideration of the 
argument that constitutional government and the principle of representation 
actually mean something. 
Arthur Maass, in his new book, Congress and the Common Good, criti-
cizes the pluralist view of the legislative process and attempts to revive the 
argument that deliberation in Congress leads to the public interest. How is it, 
Maass asks, that according to many pluralist theorists, all interests except the 
public interest are knowable and definable? Maass sees the legislative process 
as a continuous process of deliberation and discussion about the common good 
which refines and enlarges our "breadth of view." The key to this, according 
to Maass, is the institutional environment or context. 7 
4 
II 
The contributors to this special issue of the Journal of Political Science 
offer a variety of answers t? the question "Does_ th_e . C~nstitution ~ove~?" 
Th first essay, by Louis Fisher, explores extraJudic1al influences , mcluding 
~al ideological, and political factors, on the development of constitutional 
OCI , h "d . ha "gnfi ff Jaw. Fisher concludes ~t sue cons1 erati~ns ve a s1 can~ e ect on 
h evolution of constitutional law, a conclusion he documents with a range 
t r\istorical and modem examples. James W. Ceaser adopts the opposite 
~ck , and looks at the effect . of constitutional princi~le~ of political cult~re. 
easer examines the connection between our Constitub.on and our constitu-
tion and argues that our written Constitution, and the ongoing debate over 
the 'principles of that Constitution, continue to inform the development of 
our political culture. He concludes that the American constitutional order re-
mains viable because it represents a healthy synthesis of the two traditions 
m American politics, namely, the federalist and the antifederalist, or the ur-
ban and the rural. 
The article by Randall W. Strahan moves out of the realm of high the-
ory to a more practical and particular focus on the Constitution's "originating 
clau e" and the role of the constitution in the politics of federal taxation. 
trahan asks, in effect , does the originating clause govern? He concludes 
that, while the originating clause has not consistently dictated the formation 
of tax policy, it generally has been followed throughout our history, and it 
may provide a standard worth adhereing to in the future in order to maintain 
a measure of stability in tax decisionmaking. 
Danny Adkison's article and the essay by Marcia Whicker, Ruth Ann 
trickland, and Raymond Moore both raise the question: why has the Con-
titution survived for two hundred years? Adkison maintains that the Consti-
tution remains viable because the Founders, as students of political 
philosophy, based the Constitution on a profound understanding of the con-
nection between human nature and politics. The Constitution survives, ac-
cording to Adkison, because it is compatible with human nature. Whicker, 
trickland, and Moore present an interesting exploratory study which seeks 
to explain the constitutional amendment process in terms of two broad 
causal models. The constitution governs, they conclude, because it is adapt-
able. 
Finally, Tinsley E. Yarbrough raises the enduring question of the na-
ture of constitutional interpretation within the context of his focus on the in-
terpr tivist jurisprudence of Justice Hugo Black. Yarbrough defends Justice 
Black's interpretivism as holding the Constitution up as "higher law," thus 
enabling the constitution to govern. The Yarbrough essay, with its examina-
tion of the "constitutional faith of Justice Black," provides an appropriate 
close to the six essays in this special edition of the Journal of Political Sci-
ence. All six essays provide different, yet consistently challenging, answers 
to the questions: does the Constitution govern? In this bicentennial year it is 
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